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ANTITRUST LAW
OVERVIEW
During the period of this survey the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals'
antitrust decisions all involved private actions brought pursuant to the Sher-
man Act.' The court was given the opportunity to address the issue of per se
versus rule of reason analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act 2 in Board of
Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. 3 In other cases surveyed
herein the court considered issues involving jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act, 4 vertical price restraints, 5 attempted monopolization, 6 and the corpo-
rate conspiracy doctrine. 7 Additionally, the court construed the scope of the
National Football League's limited antitrust exemption, 8 ruled on the ap-
propriate statute of limitations analysis for claims involving business fail-
ures, 9 and articulated the conditions necessary to state an antitrust claim
relating to a competitor's purchase of idle production facilities.' 0
I. PER SE ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS:
FOOTBALL POWERS 2, NCAA 0
In Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Assocation,'' the Tenth
Circuit, over Judge Barrett's dissent, held that exclusive broadcasting con-
tracts between the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and
three television networks were both per se and rule of reason violations
12 of
the Sherman Act.' 3 This comment will articulate the reasoning of the Tenth
Circuit and the district court, and will briefly consider the Tenth Circuit's
per se methodology in light of recent Burger Court decisions.
A. Facts
The NCAA, founded in 1905, consists of approximately 800 member
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
3. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
4. See Lease Lights, Inc. v. Public Serv. Co., 701 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1983).
5. See A.A.A. Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 705 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1903 (1983).
6. See Olsen v. Progressive Music Supply, Inc., 703 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 197 (1983).
7. See Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 347
(1983).
8. See Colorado High School Activities Ass'n v. National Football League, 711 F.2d 943
(10th Cir. 1983).
9. See Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.), cert. dened, 103 S. Ct.
576 (1982).
10. See id.
11. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
12. For a discussion of the distinction between per se and rule of reason violations of sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act, see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
13. 707 F.2d at 1156, 1160.
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colleges and universities.' 4 The NCAA exercises control over diverse aspects
of intercollegiate athletic competition including playing rules, recruiting reg-
ulations, standards of academic eligibility, and amateurism.' 5 These func-
tions are consistent with the NCAA's original purposes of preserving college
sports on an amateur level and ensuring that student athletics are integrated
with a university's educational mission.
16
The NCAA has regulated football telecasts of member schools since
1953.17 Regulation was initiated in response to the concern of some NCAA
members that live attendance at their games would suffer as a result of com-
petition from televised games.' 8 Early regulations included allocation of tel-
evision revenue, limitation of the number of weekly football telecasts, and
limitation of the number of appearances permitted a team during the
season. 19
From 1953 through 1976 the specific television controls imposed upon
member schools were subject to approval by direct vote of the entire NCAA
membership, only a minority of which were schools having "major" football
programs.2 0 Since 1976, the specific details of the controls have not been
subject to direct vote.2 ' Member schools now vote only upon general guide-
lines, while the controls themselves are formulated through negotiation be-
tween the NCAA and the television networks.
22
By the mid-1970's a majority of the large schools operating successful
14. Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282
(W.D. Okla. 1982), afdinpart and rev'd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
272 (1983).
15. 546 F. Supp. at 1284.
16. See 707 F.2d at 1163-64 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
17. 546 F. Supp. at 1283. Until 1971 authority for the control of football telecasts was
derived from the general powers granted to the NCAA in its constitution and bylaws. In 1971
the bylaws were amended to add language specifically granting authority to regulate members'
football telecasts. Bylaw I1l-l-(aa) provided in pertinent part: "The [Football Television] Com-
mittee shall be responsible for the formulation and administration of the Association's football
television policy and program, subject to the approval of the membership." 546 F. Supp. at
1284. In 1981 the NCAA issued an "Official Interpretation" of Bylaw I l-1-(aa) reaffirming its
exclusive power to control football telecasts. 546 F. Supp. at 1285. Football is the only sport in
which the NCAA has completely regulated its members' broadcast rights. Id. at 1284.
18. 546 F. Supp. at 1283. From 1952 through 1957 the Football Television Committee of
the NCAA retained the services of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of
Chicago to study the effects of televised college football games on live gate attendance. The
studies supported the belief that football attendance tended to decrease at games being played
within the television viewing region. Id. In rejecting argument by the NCAA that television
controls were necessary to protect live attendance at games, the district court questioned the
reliability of the National Opinion Research Center studies because the studies failed to give
due consideration to factors other than football telecasts which might have affected attendance
at football contests. Id. at 1295.
19. Id. at 1283. The first controls limited television exposures to one game per week, per-
mitted a team only one television appearance during the season, allowed the sponsors to select
the game to be televised, and divided television revenue between the teams playing the game
and the NCAA. Id. Under the present contracts, television network exposures have increased
to 228 games per season, schools are permitted to appear on six network broadcasts every two
years, and the number of networks broadcasting games has increased from one to three. See id.
at 1291-93.
20. Id. at 1283. Fewer than 500 of the NCAA's 800 voting members have football pro-
grams; of that number only 187 are in Division I, which is comprised of the largest schools. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. The district court noted that the NCAA's independent negotiation power has
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football programs, including the University of Oklahoma and the University
of Georgia, had become disenchanted with the inequities of the NCAA tele-
vision regulatory scheme2 3 and joined together to form the College Football
Association (CFA) to represent their interests within the NCAA. 24 After at-
tempts by the CFA to lobby within the NCAA proved ineffective, and efforts
to negotiate a television contract independent of the NCAA were unsuccess-
ful primarily because of NCAA threats, 25 the Universities of Oklahoma and
Georgia brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma seeking to enjoin enforcement of the NCAA's television
contracts. 26 The universities alleged that the NCAA regulations precluding
member schools from independently negotiating the sale of football telecast
rights violated the antitrust laws.
2 7
B. Distrzct Court Deczszon
1. Standing
The District Court held that the plaintiff universities were subject to
both direct and threatened antitrust injury, either of which was sufficient to
confer standing to seek an injunction. 28 Injury-in-fact existed because the
contracts entered into between the NCAA and the television networks for
the years 1982-1985 threatened future revenues of the schools and the NCAA
had manifested its willingness to enforce its exclusive marketing position by
conduct harmful to the plaintiffs. 29 The fact that plaintiffs were seeking in-
creased profits did not prevent characterizing their causal economic injury as
antitrust injury. 30 Plaintiffs had therefore alleged both an existing contro-
versy and existing antitrust injury, establishing the justiciability of their anti-
trust action.
31
been demonstrated through its acceptance of contracts contradicting general principles ap-
proved by the membership. Id.
23. See id. at 1285. In particular, the major football schools objected to equal division of
television revenues with schools having less prestigious programs. For example, the
Oklahoma/University of Southern California and Citadel/Appalachian State games were both
broadcast on the same afternoon in 1981. Although the former was shown on over 200 stations
and the latter on only four, each school received an identical fee for its broadcast rights. Id. at
1291.
24. Id. at 1285.
25. In 1981 the CFA contracted with NBC to televise football games. NBC rescinded the
contract after most of the CFA members withdrew from participation in the contract under
threat of sanctions by the NCAA. Id. at 1286.
26. Id. at 1286. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) states in pertinent part: "Any person, firm, corpora-
tion, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the
United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws."
27. 546 F. Supp. at 1304.
28. Id. at 1302.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1303. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977) held that
plaintiffs must show they have can suffered "antitrust injury" before they could invoke federal
antitrust laws. See id. at 489. "Antitrust injury" is a deleterious impact on a plaintiffs ability to
reap the rewards of free competition. See id. at 486-89. Because the increased profits sought by
plaintiffs would result from restoration of competition, the NCAA's restrictions on plaintiffs'
current profitability constituted antitrust injury within the meaning of Aleblo Bowl-O-Mai. 546
F. Supp. at 1304-05.
31. 546 F. Supp. at 1304.
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2. The Sherman Act: Per Se and Rule of Reason Analysis Under
Section 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal."'3 2 The Court recognized early on that Congress did not
intend literal construction of section 1, because such a construction could
conceivably invalidate all contracts. 33 Instead, courts "were expected to give
shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradi-
tion."'34 Responding to Congress' invitation, the Court developed the per se
and rule of reason analytical approaches to application of section one.
35
Per se analysis is applied to "naked" restraints of trade-restraints
whose anticompetitive effects are apparent without extended analysis.
36
Proof that a defendant has engaged in a practice condemned by the per se
rule establishes a Sherman Act violation; the plaintiff is not required to show
that the defendant's use of the practice actually resulted in an unreasonable
restraint on competition. 37 Rule of reason inquiry, conversely, mandates ex-
amination of whether a restraint in fact promotes, rather than suppresses,
competition in a particular market environment. 38 Facts and circumstances
surrounding the restraint should be considered in evaluating a restraint's
effect.
39
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
33. E.g., Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
34. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
35. See, e.g., id. at 692. The per se concept of illegality under the Sherman Act was first
articulated in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The "rule of
reason" stems from early common law, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
687-89 (citing Mitchell v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711)), and was quickly incorporated
into section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
36. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) articulated the essence of the per
se rule: "[Clertain agreements or practices... because of their pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use." Id. at 5.
37. Id. at 5.
38. The classic formulation of the rule of reason was articulated by Justice Brandeis in
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Writing for the Court, Justice Brandeis
stated:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test,
as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regula-
tion of trade restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition."
Id. at 238.
39. To determine [the unreasonableness of a restraint] the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular restraint, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
Id. at 238. Accord National Soc5, of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
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3. The District Court's Per Se Analysis: Price Fixing
The district court held, as its first ground of decision, that the NCAA's
television controls constituted price fixing, a per se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.4 0 Before examining the merits of the alleged per se viola-
tion, however, the court rejected the NCAA's argument that the amateur
nature of college football required special antitrust treatment for the
NCAA's restrictions.4 1 Pointing to the huge sums involved in financing
higher education and the intense (and professional) competition for those
funds, the court found that it was "cavil to suggest that college football, or
indeed higher education itself, is not a business." '42 Hence, the NCAA's con-
duct was evaluated under general antitrust principles.
Turning to the merits of the price-fixing claims, the district court found
that the television package had literally fixed prices in two ways. First, the
plan effectively dictated the price the networks would pay for each telecast.
43
Second, the plan dictated the price each school could receive for its telecast
rights. 44 The court then observed that not all action literally fixing prices is
considered "price fixing" for purposes of per se analysis. 45 In Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc 46 the Court had emphatically distin-
guished between literal price fixing and the "categories of business behavior
to which the per se rule [against price fixing] has been held applicable."
4 7
Thus, the relevant inquiry in a case involving literal price fixing is whether
the activity resulting in a fixed price for competitors' products is one which,
on its face, leads to the reductions in competition and output which are char-
acteristic of condemned price fixing arrangements.
48
Following the guidelines of Broadcast Music, the district court proceeded
to analyze the per se nature of the NCAA's marketing program. The NCAA
likened its sale of its members' television rights to the blanket licensing
agreements Broadcast Music excluded from per se treatment. 49 The defend-
ants in Broadcast Music served as agents for licensing the performing rights to
members' copyrighted material, issuing nonexclusive blanket licenses enti-
tling licensees to unrestricted use of members' material. 50 Licensees were
charged a single fee for a blanket license, regardless of the number of compo-
sitions used by the licensee and regardless of the number of times a particu-
lar composition was performed. 5 ' The Court declined to apply per se
analysis to this licensing arrangement, despite acknowledging the presence of
40. See 546 F. Supp. at 1304-09.
41. See id. at 1288.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1305. The district court's findings of fact detailed how the exclusive features of
the plan, in conjunction with a contractually stated minimum total payment, operated to set an
identical price for each televised game. See id. at 1289-90; 1292-94.
44. Id. at 1305. See also id. at 1292-94.
45. Id. at 1305.
46. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 20. See 546 F. Supp. at 1305.
49. 546 F. Supp. at 1306.




"literal" price fixing, because use of the blanket licenses did not facially ap-
pear to be a practice that would "always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output. '52 The Court found that the blanket li-
cense was reasonably necessary to protect the federally-created right of copy-
right;53 was necessary to create an efficient market for musical copyrights;
54
was, in a meaningful sense, a unique product;55 and, importantly, the license
did not preclude copyright owners or licensees from negotiating individual
licensing arrangements. 56 Broadcast Music's joint license was therefore far
from a "naked" restraint of the trade in copyrights; the license, and its "fixed
price," were a good faith and facially reasonable response to unique market
problems.57 Per se treatment was therefore inappropriate.
58
The district court rejected the NCAA's analogy to Broadcast Music for
several reasons. Significantly, marketing exigencies did not require schools
to cooperate beyond agreeing to play a particular game.59 Joint sale of tele-
vision rights was therefore not a joint venture necessitated by marketing real-
ities, but was merely a device restricting output by limiting the number of
games available for broadcast and fixing the price for those games. 60 Addi-
tionally, football telecast rights were not a property right existing as a result
of federal law, thereby eliminating any quasi-presumption in favor of the
NCAA's restrictions.6 ' The most important distinction for the district court,
however, was the inability of NCAA members to negotiate individual sales
of their television rights.62 This feature rendered the plan more like a hori-
zontal price fixing agreement than a true joint venture.
63
Given the overwhelming marketing restrictions created by the NCAA's
price fixing program, per se treatment was required. 64 Having found per se
treatment appropriate, under Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical SoCiety65 the
NCAA's procompetitive justifications for price fixing were not relevant.
66
Quoting Maricopa County, the court stated:
The respondents' principal argument is that the per se rule is inap-
52. See id. at 20-23.
53. Id. at 18-19.
54. Id. at 20. The blanket license created an efficient market by eliminating the prohibi-
tive costs forseeable if every copyright use had to be individually negotiated, by minimizing the
risk of copyright infringement, and by providing an effective means for enforcing a copyright's
exclusivity. Id. at 20-21.
55. Id. at 21-22.
56. Id. at 23-24.
57. See id. at 24.
58. Id.
59. 546 F. Supp. at 1306.
60. Id. See also. id. at 1307 (joint license at issue in Broadcast Music was a necessary means
for marketing copyrighted musical compositions).
61. Cf id. at 1306 (noting that Broadcast Music found it anomalous to characterize a mar-
keting arrangement necessary to protect a federal property right as a per se violation of federal
antitrust law; see Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 18-19).
62. 546 F. Supp. at 1308.
63. See id Cf Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23 (freedom to sell copyright outside license
arrangement indicated that blanket license was not "simple horizontal arrangement among
competitors").
64. 546 F. Supp. at 1308.
65. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
66. 546 F. Supp. at 1308.
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plicable because their agreements are alleged to have procompeti-
tive justifications. The argument indicates a misunderstanding of
the per se concept. The anticompetitive potential inherent in all
price fixing arrangements justifies their facial invalidation even if
procompetitive justifications are offered for some. Those claims of
enhanced competition are so unlikely to prove significant in any
particular case that we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in
its general application.
6 7
Having rejected the NCAA's argument that its marketing arrangement
was facially legitimate, the district court considered the NCAA's contention
that the television controls properly escaped per se analysis because they
were merely ancillary to NCAA regulations related to player recruitment,
playing rules, amateurism, and player grants-in-aid.68 According to the
NCAA, as ancillary restraints the television marketing controls could not be
treated as intrinsically anticompetitive restraints, and were therefore not
properly subjected to per se treatment.
69
The court set forth the elements of the ancillary restraint doctrine as
1) proof that a particular restraint is reasonably necessary to accomplish an
arrangement's legitimate purposes, and is no broader than reasonably neces-
sary; 2) the absence of unreasonable anticompetitive effects; and 3) imposi-
tion by a party or parties lacking monopoly power. 70 Applying the test it
had articulated, the court rejected the NCAA's ancillary restraint argument.
As a threshold matter, the NCAA failed to provide any evidence explaining
why its marketing monopoly was necessary to effect its overall regulatory
program. 71 Further, the NCAA enjoyed sufficient noncommercial controls
to accomplish its legitimate purposes without regulating football telecasts. 72
Finally, the NCAA could not be permitted to restrain the success of some
market participants in order to ensure a viable market for others; the Sher-
man Act required that free competition rule the marketplace. 73 For all the
above reasons, the television plan did not qualify as a permissible "ancillary
restraint."7 4
4. The District Court's Per Se Analysis: Group Boycott
The plaintiffs also argued that the NCAA's television controls were ille-
gal as a group boycott.7 5 The district court agreed, holding that the controls
constituted a group boycott under several theories. First, because coopera-
67. Id. (quoting Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 351).
68. 546 F. Supp. at 1309.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1309 (citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir.
1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153,
185-92 (S.D. N.Y. 1960)). See generally Harrison, Drice Fixing, The Professions, and Ancillary Re-
straints: Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 926; Louis, Restraints Ancillary to
Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logtcally Surive Sylvania and Broad-
cast Music? 66 VA. L. REV. 879 (1980).
71. 546 F. Supp. at 1309.
72. Id. at 1310.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1311.
75. Id.
1984]
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tion among producers was necessary to compete in the market, the produ-
cers' agreement not to trade with non-NCAA producers (non-NCAA
schools) constituted a group boycott. 76 Second, the producers' agreement
not to trade with networks not selected by the NCAA constituted a horizon-
tal agreement not to deal with specified buyers.
7 7
5. District Court's Rule of Reason Analysis
Following its per se analysis of the television controls the court ex-
amined the controls under the rule of reason, in the interests of litigation
efficiency.7 8 As described above, rule of reason analysis is limited to ascer-
taining whether a restraint either promotes or suppresses competition. 79 A
restraint's impact on competitive conditions 8° is evaluated by considering
both the nature or character of the restraint and the intent underlying the
restraint, as manifested in the history and circumstances surrounding the
restraint. 8' Either inquiry may lead to characterization of a restraint as un-
reasonable. 82 The district court found the television controls unreasonable,
and therefore illegal, under both branches of the test.
83
By regulating the number of games telecast, the price for broadcast
rights, and the ability of traders (schools) to choose their trading partners,
the NCAA controls were unreasonable in character.8 4 Further, the lack of
responsiveness to consumer (i.e. viewer) preference was highly offensive; this
fact clearly illuminated the market restrictions embodied in the controls.
8 5
Given the NCAA's inability to prove that the restraints in fact had redeem-
ing procompetitive benefits sufficient to mitigate the facial unreasonableness
76. Id. at 1311-12 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). Associated
Press involved an agreement among newspapers (producers) not to sell their product (news) to
non-combine newspapers. 326 U.S. at 8-9. The Court found the arrangement illegal under
section 1, although the agreement was not explicitly characterized as a per se group boycott. See
id. at 18-19. See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-
60 (1961) (conspiratorial refusal to supply necessary competitive input to competitor on same
market tier of some conspirators stated per se claim).
77. 546 F. Supp. at 1313. The court recognized that most per se group boycotts involved
horizontal conspiracies affecting competitors on the conspirators' market tier, but held that be-
cause the effects of the NCAA's exclusive contract were indistinguishable from the effects of a
classic horizontal boycott the per se rule was applicable. Id Cf. Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabi-
net Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979) (per se boycott present because of market effects even
though there was no numerosity of actors on either market tier).
78. 546 F. Supp. at 1314.
79. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
80. Noneconomic justifications or effects are irrelevant in evaluating a restraint's reasona-
bleness. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-92 (1978).
81. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978); Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
82. National Soc5' ofProfessional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
83. 546 F. Supp. at 1315.
84. Id. at 1317-19.
85. See id. at 1319. The court stated:
Every witness who testified on the matter confirmed that the consumers, the viewers of
college football television, receive absolutely no benefit from the controls. Many
games for which there is a larger viewer demand are kept from the viewers, and many
games for which there is little if any demand are nonetheless televised.
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of the restraints,8 6 the NCAA's television program was illegal under the rule
of reason.
8 7
Similarly, the intent underlying the controls, as indicated by their his-
torical development and manner of implementation, was anticompetitive,
thereby rendering the controls unreasonable.88 The court concluded that
the purpose of the regulations was "to enhance the television revenues of less
prominent football-playing schools" at the expense of the major football
powers, and to provide income to the NCAA.8 9 The court rejected argu-
ments that the primary purpose of restricting telecasts was to maintain live
gate attendance, 9 0 and that the controls were properly ancillary to the
NCAA's noneconomic goals. 9' Finally, the NCAA's concern with establish-
ing exclusive power over its members' football television rights was not man-
ifested until CFA members attempted to exercise control over their television
rights, shedding further doubt on the NCAA's asserted altruistic purpose in
controlling football rights.
92
6. The Sherman Act: Monopolization Under Section 2
A two-step inquiry was conducted into plaintiffs' allegations that the
NCAA had monopolized the college television market in violation of section
2 of the Sherman Act. 93 After defining the relevant product market to be
college football television, 94 the court found that the NCAA had monopo-
lized the market.
95
The NCAA had contended that college football television did not con-
stitute a separate market because the economic characteristics of the alleged
market were inconsistent with a monopoly scenario, 96 and because other tel-
evision programming could be readily substituted for college football tele-
casts.9 7 Within the larger market consisting of all television broadcasts, the
NCAA would not have market power, and therefore could not have engaged
in monopolization. 98 The court rejected the NCAA's arguments.
86. The court found that the restraints had enhanced neither live viewership nor competi-
tive balance. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1317.
89. 546 F. Supp. at 1315.
90. While this purpose may have originally motivated the NCAA, the NCAA's modern
television program evinced little concern for protecting live attendance. For example, the latest
network contracts provide for up to nine hours of football telecasts on Saturday afternoons, and
also require the networks to telecast more games than would be shown in an unrestricted mar-
ket. Id.
91. Id. at 1316. The court found that the television restrictions made little, if any, contri-
bution to preserving competitive balance. Further, the television contracts restricted the com-
mercial activities of NCAA members, not the actual specifics of competition. Id.
92. See id. at 1316-17.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). This section states in relevant part "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
94. 546 F. Supp. at 1319-23.
95. Id. at 1323-24.
96. See id. at 1319-20.
97. See id. at 1320-23.
98. See id. at 1321.
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Expert economic testimony supporting the NCAA was rejected because
production in the college televised football market was not a function of
marginal cost; games were played regardless of incremental increases in tele-
vision revenue. 99 Hence, the NCAA's micro-economically based marketing
analysis was inherently flawed. 00 Further, the market for televised football
had never existed without the presence of NCAA controls. Thus, comparing
the actual price and output behavior of televised football with behavior the-
oretically forseeable in a monopolized market was irrelevant; the significance
of actual behavior could not be evaluated except in terms of a controlled
market.'o'
Having rejected the NCAA's attempt to theoretically define the rele-
vant market, the court examined evidence of college football's actual inter-
changeability of with other television programming. The court concluded
that televised college football was a separate market because other television
programming was not in fact readily interchangeable with college foot-
ball. 0 2 The court found that the NCAA was able to increase the price for
college football telecasts dramatically without a corresponding increase in
output (zte., the number of games telecast).10 3 Similarly, advertisers allo-
cated a disproportionate share of their total advertising budgets to college
football broadcasts. 10 4 These two factors led the court to hold that the rele-
vant market was college football broadcasts. '
0 5
Once the relevant market was defined, the court had little trouble find-
ing that the NCAA had monopoly power within that market: the NCAA
99. Id. at 1319.
100. Id. at 1320.
101. Id.
102. Id. United States v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) held that the
relevant market for evaluating monopoly power should be determined by considering the de-
gree to which other products were readily substitutable for the allegedly monopolized product.
See id. at 393, 400.
1 103. In 1981, ABC paid $31 million for 24 broadcast exposures. In 1982, ABC and CBS
paid $59 million for 28 similar exposures, a 62% price increase in the cost of a broadcast. By
1985, the networks will pay S72 million for 28 exposures. 546 F. Supp. at 1322. The court
found that "no other network programming, with the possible exception of professional football,
. . . could command such a dramatic price increase with so small an increase in output." Id.
104. See id. at 1321. The court also noted the networks' belief that they would be able to
increase the price of advertising on college telecasts to correspond with the increased cost of
purchasing the football rights, and found this an additional indicium of college football's
unique market status. Id. at 1323.
105. 1d. at 1323. The court stated:
In a sense, it is difficult to understand the tremendous appeal of college football to the
networks and their advertisers. Certainly the color, pageantry and tradition of the
sport, and the interest of alumni in the sport, are significant factors. Whatever the reason,
it is clear that there is no substitute in the minds of the networks and advertisers. They pay an
enormous cost to reach an audience which is small relative to prime time program-
ming. The networks are willing to allow NCAA to substantially dictate the conditions
under which they may televise college football. The networks may even be willing to
lose money on college football in return for some intangible benefits they believe them-
selves to derive from merely being associated with the sport. It is clear that college
football does not compete with other television programming in any real sense, that it
is a market unto itself, and that it is the relevant market for determining whether




clearly exercised uncontested control of college television broadcasts. '0
6 Be-
cause the NCAA had used its monopoly power to erect barriers to entry and
engaged in other anticompetitive conduct, it had monopolized the college
television football market.
10 7
C. Tenth Circutt Decision
The NCAA appealed the substantive aspects of the district court's deci-
sion regarding standing, the illegality of the television controls under per se
and rule of reason analysis, and the existence of a group boycott.' 0 8 In a
decision written by Judge Logan, the Tenth Circuit held that the Universi-
ties of Oklahoma and Georgia suffered the type of injury conferring antitrust
standing;10 9 that the controls constituted illegal price fixing under both per
set to and rule of reason analysis;' II and that the controls did not constitute a
per se group boycott.'' 2 Judge Barrett filed a dissenting opinion.'' 3
1. Standing
The court held that the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia had
standing to attack the television controls as a horizontal price fixing conspir-
acy.' 14 Many of the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs related to restrictions
on their trading freedom, and were thus more analogous to the injuries flow-
ing from vertical restraints than to the decreased output and price enhance-
ment injuries traditionally associated with cartelization.' 15  The court
relaxed the rigors of the standing inquiry, however, because the plaintiffs
sought only injunctive relief.'' 6 Given the relaxed procedural posture and
the fact that plaintiffs' injuries were "inextricably intertwined" with the al-
leged horizontal conspiracy, plaintiff's had standing to challenge the
NCAA's practices as horizontal price fixing.'17 The Tenth Circuit also
found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the plan's other
provisions. " 8
106. Id. at 1323. Cf United States v. E. 1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394
(1956) (monopoly power found in relevant market consisting of single product).
107. 546 F. Supp. at 1323.
108. Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 707 F.2d 1147, 1150
(10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983). The NCAA also appealed the district court's
market definition, but this issue was not addressed by the Tenth Circuit. 707 F.2d at 1159 n. 16.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit granted the NCAA's request to modify the scope of the injunc-
tive relief granted by the court. See id. at 1162.
109. 707 F.2d at 1152_
110. Id. at 1156.
Ill. /d. at 1160.
112. Id. at 1161.
113. Id. at 1162 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1152.
115. Id. at 1151.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1152. The court rejected the NCAA's contention that the plaintiffs' participa-
tion in the conspiracy barred standing to challenge the legality of the conspiracy's restraints. Id.




2. Per Se Analysis
Like the district court, the Tenth Circuit recognized that under Broad-
cast Muszc the NCAA's literal price fixing might not be subject to per se
treatment.' 19 Judge Logan stated, however, that characterizing a horizontal
relationship as an integration necessary to effect market efficiencies was not
in itself sufficient to invoke rule of reason analysis.' 20 Rather, the proper
inquiry to determine the appropriateness of per se treatment was whether
the marketing integration's restraints, considered facially, would inevitably
tend to suppress competition.12 ' Under this standard, the television pro-
gram's price-fixing effect could escape per se treatment only if the program
could satisfy two tests. First, the underlying integration must itself be capa-
ble of increasing market efficiency.' 22 Second, the restraint must be "capa-
ble of increasing the effectiveness of [the integration] and no broader than
necessary for that purpose."'
123
The court's per se analysis began by addressing the NCAA's argument
that the television controls were ancillary to the NCAA's function as a coop-
erative rulemaking and rule-enforcing body.' 2 4  Essentially, the court
treated the NCAA as asserting that its function was to ensure the continued
viability of amateur college in order to increase viewership, which was the
"output" of the college football industry. 125 Thus, if the television restraints
protected or increased viewer interest in college football, they were properly
ancillary to the NCAA's rulemaking function.1
2 6
Viewership "output" allegedly consisted of two discrete products: the
right to view a game in person, and the right to televise the game.'2 7 By
limiting the number of broadcasts the live attendance component of output
was increased, enhancing the efficiency of the market.' 2 8 The Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the NCAA's analysis, concluding that even if viewership was
the relevant product, live viewership could not be segmented from overall
viewership. 129 No record evidence established that overall viewership was
enhanced by the controls. ' 30 Further, the record showed that serious market
distortions accompanied a system enhancing live viewership by restricting
119. 707 F.2d at 1152.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. I, 19-
20 (1979)). The Tenth Circuit rejected the United States' amicus argument that facial exami-
nation of the ancillary controls under the promotion of/suppression of competition standard
was inconsistent with per se inquiry. The potential procompetitive benefits of integrating pro-
duction activities required some degree of inquiry beyond merely identifying the objective ef-
fects of a restraint. Hence, facial consideration of pro-competitive justifications for restraints
accompanying an integration was consistent with per se analysis under Broadcast Music. 707
F.2d at 1152 n.6.
122. 707 F.2d at 1153. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21-23.
123. 707 F.2d at 1153 (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 279 (1978)).
124. See 707 F.2d at 1153.
125. Se id.
126. See id.






television viewership.131 Thus, the television program's direct viewership ef-
fects did not support characterizing the program as an ancillary restraint to
an acceptable marketing integration. 
132
Additionally, the asserted purpose of maintaining competitive balance
among the various NCAA members' football teams did not enable the televi-
sion controls to be deemed an ancillary restraint.133 Noneconomic justifica-
tions for restraints were irrelevant in assessing a restraint's competitive
consequences.' 34 Further, the Sherman Act did not countenance a restric-
tion designed to protect a market by limiting competition. 135 Finally, the
court noted that less restrictive means were available to the NCAA for pro-
moting its parity goals.' 36
The NCAA's second argument characterized the television controls as
ancillary to an integrated marketing arrangement. 137  Including price and
output restraints in the television contracts was allegedly necessary in order
to market college football as a television series in competition with entertain-
ment series like "Dallas."'1 38 In effect, the television controls "restrain[ed]
intrabrand competition (competition among football games) in order to
stimulate interbrand competition (competition between NCAA football and
other entertainment programming)."' 139 The court declined to explore this
argument, however, because it found that the marketing integration was it-
self a per se violation;140 a fortiori, the restraints accompanying the intergra-
tion were impermissible. 141
The joint marketing arrangement was impermissible because of its over-
whelming anticompetitive potential. The joint marketing program created
no new product similar to the blanket license at issue in Broadcast Music: the
NCAA license merely provided a single product on an exclusive basis.' 42
Also, unlike the license in Broadcast Music, the television plan did not permit
individual sales by the combination's members, 14 3 thereby creating a signifi-
cant risk of cartelization." Finally, the Broadcast Music joint license was
nonexclusive; the seasonal exclusivity of the NCAA's plan operated to ex-
clude forseeable purchasers for single game rights, potentially permanently
foreclosing many broadcasters from entering the televised football mar-
ket. " 5 Taken in its entirety, the NCAA's joint marketing program facially
131. Id. The television program reduced output of desired products (by restricting the
games which could be televised), and increased consumption of less desirable products (by re-
quiring minor games to be televised). Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing National Soc'y qProfes.ronal Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-96).
135. 707 F.2d at 1154 (citing National Socjy of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689, 696).
136. 707 F.2d at 1154.




141. Id. at 1155 n.14. See also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 1156. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21-22 (joint license was "truly greater than
the sum of its parts").





tended to reduce competition and output. 14 6 Hence, the NCAA's price-
fixing plan was one of those forms of business behavior constituting a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.
147
2. The Tenth Circuit's Rule of Reason Analysis
Although they found the television program to be invalid per se, the
majority examined the program under the rule of reason because of the pros-
pect of Supreme Court review.t 48 The analysis, which concentrated on the
controls' anticompetitive impact rather than the NCAA's anticompetitive
purpose, 14 9 began by assessing the trading irregularities resulting from the
controls.' 5 0 Market concentration resulted because participants were lim-
ited to one seller (the NCAA) and three buyers (ABC, CBS, and Turner).' 5 '
The NCAA's contracts also limited price competition among those buy-
ers.152 The contracts therefore resulted in vertical foreclosure of buyers, and
the inability of sellers (NCAA members) to freely sell their television
rights.153 The court found that these obvious results of the NCAA plan were
not, however, the plan's only anticompetitive effects. ' 5 4
The horizontal aspect of the NCAA's plan created the risk that, if the
NCAA possessed market power, the plan could result in artificial price en-
hancement.' 5 5 Similarly, the vertical foreclosure aspects of the plan would
have anticompetitive consequences among the class of potential purchasers if
college football was in fact not a readily interchangeable product. 156 By
analyzing the NCAA's market power, the court would be able to assess the
full competitive impact of the plan.'
5 7
NCAA market power was established by pointing to the large audience
share and high cost per advertising minute commanded by college football
telecasts on Saturday afternoons. 158 The NCAA's plan therefore manifested
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1157.
149. The court agreed that the two-prong rule of reason inquiry, see supra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text, was proper, but did not investigate the purposes underlying the restraints.
See 707 F.2d at 1157-60.





155. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
156. 707 F.2d at 1157.
157. The price enhancement risk would become apparent because market power involves
the power to control prices or exclude competition. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). The vertical foreclosure risk would become apparent because
market power only exists when price rises of a product do -not cause significant purchases of a
reasonably substitutable product. Id. at 404. Thus, if market power existed, vertical foreclosure
would be present. See 707 F.2d at 1157-58.
158. 707 F.2d at 1158-59. The court observed that even if its definition of the relevant
market was underinclusive, the prejudicial impact of that error could be obviated by attributing
less significance to market power when evaluating the plan's anticompetitive effects. Id. at 1159
(citing L. SULLIVAN, HANDBX)K OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 17, at 61 (1966)). Similarly, the
court noted that the degree of market power necessary to find a violation of section 1 under the




the anticompetitive risks stemming from a finding of market power.
159 In
light of the anticompetitive risks stemming from NCAA market power, the
existence of market-neutral means of preserving competitive balance,'
60 the
elimination of intrabrand price competition, 16 ' and the NCAA's coercive
seizure of its members television rights,' 62 the plan was unreasonably an-
ticompetitive and therefore illegal under the rule of reason.'
63
3. The Tenth Circuit's Group Boycott Analysis
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the issue of group
boycott. No per se boycott existed with respect to the broadcasters because
the broadcasters were not in a horizontal relationship with the NCAA mem-
bers.' 64 Enforcement of NCAA policies through threat of sanctions against
NCAA members also was not a per se boycott. 165 The court held that an
expulsion imposed as part of associational discipline was not a per se boycott
unless the expulsion was "a naked attempt to exclude competition. "166 Ab-
sent such a facially anticompetitive purpose, an associational sanction's le-
gality was assessed by examining its competitive reasonableness. 1
67 Because
the NCAA's expulsion mechanism was not facially unreasonable, the lower
court's per se ruling was reversed;1 68 because the plan had already been held
illegal, the court did not consider the reasonableness of the expulsion
mechanism. '
69
4. Judge Barrett's Dissent
Judge Barrett would have reversed the district court. ' 7 0 He argued that
the lower court erred in applying per se analysis because the NCAA's
noneconomic purposes' 7 ' required deferential treatment of NCAA regula-
159. 707 F.2d at 1159. See supra note 157.
160. 707 F.2d at 1159.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
163. See 707 F.2d at 1159.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1160-61. The court distinguished the authorities the lower court relied on in
finding a group boycott of the networks:
In KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), a retailer induced
wholesalers and manufacturers to refuse to supply its competitor. In Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), cloth-
ing manufacturers organized a boycott of retailers who dealt in the clothing of
competing manufacturers. In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656 (1961), manufacturers of gas heaters coerced an adverse "seal of ap-
proval" decision with regard to the product of a competitor. Each of these cases re-
fleets conduct by one firm inducing concerted action to deprive competing firms of
necessary trade relationships, a characteristic absent here.
707 F.2d at 1161 (emphasis supplied).




170. Id. at 1162 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
171. Judge Barrett found the NCAA's primary purposes to be maintenance of the amateur
nature of the NCAA members' sports programs and ensuring that college athletes were inte-
grated into a university's academic life. Id. at 1163.
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tions affecting its members' commercial activities. 1 72 Judge Barrett main-
tained that the television controls should have been analyzed under the rule
of reason. 173 The dissent found that the controls were properly ancillary to
the noneconomic purposes of the NCAA, and were therefore acceptable
under the rule of reason.
174
Judge Barrett's rule of reason conclusion was based on the lack of proof
that the controls injured the consumer public, 175 his finding that overall
viewership was increased by the controls, 176 and his finding that the regula-
tions operated to ensure the amateurism of NCAA football programs and the
academic achievement of NCAA members. 177 In sum, Judge Barrett found
the NCAA to be a joint venture 7 8 whose division of television revenues
among member schools was similar to the division of profits by a law part-
nership,' 7 9 and whose noneconomic motivations precluded a finding that its
television restrictions had the "pernicious effects" on competition con-
demned by the antitrust laws.' 80
D. Section / Ana'sis Under the Burger Court
Burger Court decisions have lacked consistency in their approach to sec-
tion 1 analysis.18 ' In 1972, with virtually no accompanying economic analy-
sis, the Court applied the per se rule to a horizontal allocation of territories
in United States v. Topco Association, Inc. 182 Topco was a cooperative buying
association for small and medium sized independent grocery store chains
which granted its retailer members exclusive territories in which to sell
Topco's private-label products.' 83 The Court characterized the arrange-
ment as a horizontal restraint, and therefore a per se violation of section 1,
without first considering the potential impact on competition.'
84
172. See id. at 1164 (distinguishing between amateur and professional sports); id. at 1165
(trial court's characterization of NCAA as business failed to recognize NCAA's primarily
noneconomic purpose); see also id. at 1167 (per se rule has only been held applicable to business
enterprises operated exclusively for profit; NCAA rules not within per se category because not
designed to "render greatest profit for business purpose") (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 1165.
174. Id. at 1167 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1168.
176. Id. at 1167. But see id. at 1154 (Logan, J.) (no evidence plan enhanced overall
viewership).
177. Id. at 1167.
178. Id. at 1168.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See generaly Recent Antitrust Developments, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-26 (1980). See also
Gehart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982
SuP. CT. REV. 319. Professor Gehart's thesis is that the Supreme Court came close to embrac-
ing the Chicago school's approach to antitrust analysis following United States v. Topco Assoc.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), but pulled back in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332 (1982). Gehart, supra, at 319-20. Under the Chicago school's analysis, per se rules
should only be applied after scrutinizing the consumer welfare effect of challenged behavior. Id.
at 321.
182. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
183. Id. at 601-03.
184. See id. at 608-09. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, stated that "the Court does not tell us
what 'pernicious effect on competition' the practices here outlawed are perceived to have; nor
[Vol. 61:2
ANTITRUST LAW
Chief Justice Burger did not agree that merely characterizing Topco's
conduct as a horizontal restraint justified application of a per se rule.1 8 5 In a
vigorous dissent, he rebuked the majority for failing to apply economic anal-
ysis, stating that "the judicial convenience and ready predictability that are
made possible by per se rules are not such overriding considerations in anti-
trust law as to justify their promulgation without careful prior consideration
of the relevant economic realities in the light of the basic policy and goals of
the Sherman Act."
1 86
Following Topco, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases in which
the per se rule either was not applied, or was applied only after injection of
economic analysis. National Society of Professional Engneers v. United States 187 is
representative of that line of cases.188 At issue in Professional Engneers was
whether a provision in the Society's Code of Ethics was unlawful suppression
of competition under section 1 of the Sherman Act.18 9 The provision pro-
hibited member engineers from negotiating the price of a project until a
prospective client had selected an engineer, rendering price comparison by
the client impossible. 190 The Society justified the restriction on the grounds
that price competition would result in inferior work, ultimately endangering
the public. 19 1 The Court rejected the public safety argument, reasoning that
the only permissible inquiry was economic, and involved examination of a
practice's competitive impact.' 9 2 Following a cursory economic analysis of
the restraint, 193 the Court held that the Code of Ethics restrained competi-
tion in violation of the rule of reason. 194
The Court's next major treatment of the role of economic analysis was
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.' 9 5 Broadcast Music
explicitly cautioned against applying per se characterization without exam-
ining the economic reality of a challenged restraint. 196 Only after extensive
economic analysis' 97 did the Court conclude that per se treatment was
inappropriate.198
Then, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Socit t99 the Court appar-
does it attempt to show that those practices 'lack... any redeeming virtue.' " Id. at 622 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 614-15.
187. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
188. Other cases include Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 466 U.S. 63 (1980): Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
189. 435 U.S. at 683. Section 1 1 of the Code provided in part that: "The Engineer will not
compete unfairly with another engineer by attempting to obtain employment or advancement
or professional engagements by competitive bidding." Id. at 683 n.3.
190. 435 U.S. at 684.
191. Id. at 684-85.
192. Id. at 692.
193. See id. at 692-93.
194. See id. at 681, 696.
195. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
196. Id. at 8-9.
197. See id. at 10-24.
198. See id. at 23-24.
199. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ently applied the per se rule in a manner reminiscent of Topco. Approxi-
mately seventy percent of the doctors in Maricopa County were members of
the Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care, and agreed to abide by the
Foundation's schedule of maximum fees for providing services to policyhold-
ers of specific insurance plans.2 0 0 In reversing denial of Arizona's motion for
summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that the maximum fee agree-
ments were per se unlawful price fixing, despite the fact that discovery was
incomplete. 20 ' In apparent retreat from Broadcast Music, the Court declined
to consider competitive impact once the fee schedule was characterized as
price fixing.20 2 Broadcast Music was distinguished as a case involving joint
effort creating a new product, rather than as establishing a new methodology
for examining the per se nature of a combination among horizontal market
participants.
20 3
Justice Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist. 20 4 Arguing that a sufficient factual record had not been devel-
oped, Justice Powell rebuked the majority's failure to engage in the eco-
nomic analysis required by Broadcast Music.
Before characterizing an arrangement as a per se price fixing agree-
ment meriting condemnation, a court should determine whether it
is a 'naked restrain(t) of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition.' . . . Such a determination is necessary because 'de-
parture from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon de-
monstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line
drawing.'205
In light of the Burger Court's fluctuating approach to economic analy-
sis, the Tenth Circuit's holding that the television controls are per se illegal
cannot be said to reflect an inconsistency with the Burger Court's line of
cases. In Board of Regents, the Tenth Circuit's depth of economic analysis
prior to invoking the per se rule exceeded that found in Maancopa County,
following more closely the Broadcast Music methodology. On review, the
Supreme Court will have an opportunity to clarify whether the somewhat
mechanical Maricopa County approach has supplanted the more flexible anal-
ysis of Broadcast Music. Even if the Court chooses to rely on Marcopa County's
relative trivialization of Broadcast Music,206 Board of Regents clearly provides
the Court with an opportunity to clarify the scope of the ancillary restraint
doctrine and the per se rule in the context of an integrated marketing ar-
rangement involving horizontal competitors.
Two additional aspects of Board of Regents deserve mention. First, it is
unlikely that the Court will adopt Judge Barrett's "partial exemption" ap-
proach to NCAA activities;20 7 the Burger Court's decisions indicate an in-
tent to require Congress to make exceptions to the operation of the antitrust
200. Id. at 339.
201. Id. at 356.
202. Id. at 351.
203. Id. at 355-56.
204. Id. at 357 (Powell, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 362 (citations omitted).
206. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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laws. 20 Second, the Supreme Court has hinted that rule of reason analysis
may be appropriate where buyer and seller have comparable market
power.209 If the Court finds that the television networks comprised a monop-
sony, perhaps the television controls will escape per se condemnation
through a new modification of the per se rule.
II. DISCOUNT FUNDING AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: THE
COERCIVE ESSENTIAL
Midwest, the exclusive Denver area distributor for Joseph E. Seagram
and Sons, Inc.,2 10 independently decided to discount the price of Seagram
products to selected high volume liquor retailers in an effort to increase the
competitiveness of Seagram products. 2 1 Seagram subsequently agreed to
Midwest's request for reimbursement of the discounts, stipulating, however,
that the discounts be passed through to the participating high volume retail-
ers.21 2 On appeal, 2 13 nineteen small retailers who were not permitted to
participate in the discount program alleged that Seagram's agreement with
Midwest constituted illegal vertical price fixing (resale price maintenance),
which was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.214 Appellants
argument, in its essence, was that because the record established that partici-
pants on two levels of a market had entered into an agreement affecting
resale prices, a per se violation had been established as a matter of law. 2 15
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by explaining that although resale
price maintenance agreements were per se unlawful, not every vertical agree-
ment with a resale price effect constituted resale price maintenance. 2 6 The
sine qua non of a resale price maintenance agreement was coercive action by
the manufacturer or other upper tier market participant. 21 7 Unless the
lower tier participant was coerced into selling at a price dictated by the up-
per tier participant, resale price maintenance was not present.
21 8
Appellants argued that the coercion element was satisfied because Sea-
gram required Midwest to pass the funded discount through to its custom-
ers.2 19 The Tenth Circuit disagreed because the passthrough requirement
208. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 355, National Soc> of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
692.
209. Marcopa County, 457 U.S. at 354 n. 29. See also Harrison, Price Fixing, The Professions, and
Ancillay Restraints. Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 943.
210. AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 705 F.2d 1203, 1204 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1903 (1983).
211. 705 F.2d at 1204.
212. Id. at 1205.
213. The district court found that Seagram's conduct constituted neither a per se nor rule of
reason violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 1204, 1208.
214. Id. Combinations between suppliers and distributors setting resale prices have long
been recognized to be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968). See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 408-09 (1911).
215. See 705 F.2d at 1205.
216. Id. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)
(all horizontal agreements literally fixing prices are not per se price fixing violations).





did not, in and of itself, force Midwest to set a specific resale price. 220 Mid-
west was not precluded from setting a price reflecting a discount greater
than that Seagram had agreed to support, nor was Midwest required to offer
a discounted price.22 ' Further, there was no evidence that retailers receiving
Midwest's discount were required or forced to sell at a certain price.
222
Hence, Seagram had not engaged in retail price maintenance.
223
Plaintiffs then argued that even if the discount agreement did not con-
stitute resale price maintenance, it was nonetheless a per se violation under
United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co .,224 which held that a per se violation of
its antitrust laws is present when a combination is formed "for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity. '225 In rejecting this argument, the court limited So-
cony-Vacuum to agreements arising in the context of a horizontal conspir-
acy.226 Vertical arrangements between manufacturers and wholesalers or
wholesalers and retailers which affected price did not manifest the anticom-
petitive dangers found in horizontal agreements, and thus were not per se
violations.
227
Having rejected the asserted bases for per se characterization, the Tenth
Circuit held that the lower court's rule of reason analysis properly found that
the discount program was acceptable.2 28 Evidence showed that the intent
and effect of the program were to increase interbrand competition by lower-
ing retail prices.229 Because the restraints created by the program tended to
increase interbrand competition and were not manifestly anticompetitive,
230
the trial court had correctly ruled that no section 1 violation was present.
23 1
III. ELEMENTS OF SECTION 2 OFFENSES: TENTH CIRCUIT DEFINITIONS
Olsen was a retailer of musical instruments who brought an action
against competing retailers, suppliers, and manufacturers of musical instru-
ments, alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade, fix prices, boycott Olsen, and
commit other unfair practices in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,
and attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of
section 2 of the Act. 232 The trial court allowed recovery only on claims that
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1206-07. The court pointed out that Seagram had guaranteed a gross margin on
certain products, not a net margin. See id. at 1206. Thus, Midwest was not coerced into offering
discounted prices by the lure of a net margin exceeding that which Seagram would have guar-
anteed. See id.
222. Id. at 1207.
223. Id. Accord Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 F.2d 842,846-47 (8th Cir.
1983). See also Butera v. Sun Oil Co., 496 F.2d 434 (lst Cir. 1974).
224. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
225. Id. at 223.
226. 705 F.2d at 1207.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 1208.
229. Id.
230. Id. The court observed that even several of the appellants had sustained increases in
sales of Seagram's products during the discount program. Id.
231. Id.
232. Olsen v. Progressive Music Supply, Inc., 703 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 197 (1983).
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a competing music store (Progressive) had conspired to restrain trade2 33 and
engaged in a boycott to deprive plaintiff of CBS brand instruments. 2 34 The
opinion is primarily devoted to an analysis of the propriety of the trial
court's factual conclusions, which the Tenth Circuit concluded were tena-
ble.235 The remainder of this section is therefore limited to a survey of the
general antitrust principles set forth in the opinion.
A. Attempted Monopohzation
In denying plaintiff's section 2 claims, the Tenth Circuit set forth the
elements necessary to establish both an attempt to monopolize and a con-
spiracy to monopolize. To establish an attempt to monopolize, a plaintiff
must demonstrate a dangerous probability that the defendant will success-
fully achieve the power to control prices or exclude competition,2 36 prove
acts in furtherance of the attempt,2 37 demonstrate specific intent to monopo-
lize,238 and establish the relevant market within which the attempted mo-
nopolization occurred. 23 9  Olsen's attempt claim failed because his
continued successful competition despite the conspiracy precluded a finding
of dangerous probability of success, 240 and because he presented no evidence
of a relevant market.
2 4
1
B. Conspiracy to Monopohize
The elements of conspiracy to monopolize are the existence of a combi-
nation or conspiracy to monopolize, 242 overt acts done in furtherance of the
combination or conspiracy, 24 3 effect upon an appreciable amount of inter-
state commerce,2 44 and specific intent to monopolize. 245 The court also
stated that proof of a relevant market is not required to establish a conspir-
233. 703 F.2d at 434. This victory was hollow because the trial court found that Olsen was
not injured by the conspiracy and did not award damages. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 435-41 (passim).
236. Id. at 436 (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951); Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375. 396 (1905)).
237. 703 F.2d at 436 (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951)).
238. 703 F.2d at 436 (citing Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 US. 594,
626 (1953); E. J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 306 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976)). Specific intent may be inferred from the anti-competitive nature of
the defendant's acts. E.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 180 F. Supp.
125, 140 (D. Mass.). modifrd. 284 F.2d 582 (lst Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
239. 703 F.2d at 437 & n. 1 (listing cases). See also E. J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Belle, Inc.,
525 F.2d 296, 307 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
240. 703 F.2d at 437. Another factor indicative of the failure to show a dangerous
probability of obtaining monopoly power was the absence of evidence that the defendant had a
"controlling position" in the relevant market. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 438 (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788 (1946)).
243. 703 F.2d at 438 (citing Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors
Ass'n, 436 F. Supp. 418, 425 (D.S.C. 1976), affd, 569 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1978)).
244. 703 F.2d at 438 (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947);
Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)).




acy to monopolize. 246 Because Olsen did not show that the alleged conspir-
acy had the requisite effect on interstate commerce, or that the defendant
had specific intent to monopolize, there was no conspiracy violating section
2.247
C. Group Boycott: Rejection of the Literal Approach
The trial court found that Progressive conspired with CBS in order to
prevent the plaintiff from receiving CBS products. 248 This boycott was inci-
dent to Progressive's plan to maintain its high mark-up on CBS products by
preventing low cost sales by the plaintiff.2 49 Progressive argued that plaintiff
was excluded from the market for CBS products as a necessary incident of a
legitimate joint marketing effort between Progressive and CBS.2 5 0 Thus,
even if the defendants had literally engaged in a "group boycott," their boy-
cott was not of the type condemned as a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.
2 5 1
Although the Tenth Circuit accepted defendant's premise that not all
activities literally characterizable as "boycotts" were per se violations, 252 it
disagreed with the defendant's conclusions about the boycott of Olsen. The
trial court determined that the motivations behind the boycott were either to
protect high profit margins or harm Olsen. 253 Given those findings, and the
absence of evidence of any procompetitive impacts flowing from the boycott,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Progressive had
engaged in a per se violation.
254
D. Price-Fixtng Damages and Duplication of Damages
The final issue antitrust issue was the trial court's refusal to award dam-
ages for Progressive's price fixing behavior. 255 The trial court originally re-
fused to award damages because it found that plaintiffs ability to sell below
the fixed prices precluded a finding of damages. 256 The Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed with this conclusion, 25 7 but held that damages could not be awarded
under the price-fixing claim because such damages would merely duplicate
the award under the boycott claim.
2 5 8
246. 703 F.2d at 438 (citing Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir.
1975)).




251. Id. E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consol. Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th
Cir. 1972),cert. den'ed, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) provides a thorough summary of the Supreme Court
decisions analyzing the anticompetitive risks found in those business arrangements constituting
a per se violation as a "group boycott." See 467 F.2d at 185-87.
252. 703 F.2d at 438-39.
253. Id. at 439.
254. Id.






IV. APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO INTRASTATE ACTIVITY
In Lease Lights, Inc. v. Pubhc Service C0. 25 9 the Tenth Circuit reversed the
trial court's conclusion that the commercial effects of plaintiff's business were
too localized to permit invocation of Sherman Act protections. 260 Plaintiff
was engaged in providing commercial outdoor lighting services, and alleged
that Public Service Company of Oklahoma monopolized and attempted to
monopolize a local market for commercial outdoor lighting services. 26 1 The
trial court concluded that the outdoor lighting business engaged in by both
plaintiff and defendent was essentially the "rental of illumination," which
was a purely intrastate business. 262 The trial court also concluded that al-
though plaintiff's customers were involved in interstate commerce and that
although plaintiffs lighting services were supplied with materials purchased
in interstate commerce, plaintiff had failed to introduce evidence that de-
fendant's challenged activities had adversely affected either the interstate
business of plaintiffs customers or the interstate flow of the materials used by
plaintiff.2 63 Hence, because the Sherman Act could only be invoked when
the threatened business activity was itself "in interstate commerce," or when
the challenged activities adversely affected a meaningful amount of inter-
state commerce, 264 plaintiff had not stated a claim cognizable under the
Sherman Act.
26 5
Reversing the trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the Tenth
Circuit held that the trial court had improperly required proof of an adverse
effect on interstate commerce.2 66 The court emphasized that the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the Sherman Act's jurisdictional require-
ments are satisfied when a defendant's activities merely have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 267 Because the lighting business involved an-
nual interstate purchases of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of light-
ing components, 268 the defendant's activities involved a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 26 9 Accordingly, the Sherman Act afforded protection
to plaintiffs business.
270
Lease Lights also rejected two other jurisdictional deficiencies asserted by
the defendant. First, plaintiffs uncontroverted evidence showed that the
nexus between interstate commerce and defendant's activities was con-
crete, 27 1 vitiating defendant's contention that plaintiff had alleged only a
259. 701 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1983).
260. Id. at 798.
261. Id. at 796.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 797.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 798-99 (quoting from McClain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975)).
267. 701 F.2d at 796.
268. Id. at 799.
269. Id.
270. Uncontroverted evidence showed that the majority of outdoor lighting installations




speculative connection between defendant's activities and interstate com-
merce. 27 2 Second, the fact that plaintiff's injuries may have been self-in-
flicted 2 73 did not eliminate the public injury inhering in monopolistic
activities. 27 4 Hence, the Sherman Act requirement of public injury2 75 was
present.
276
V. INTRACORPORATE CONSPIRACY AND LICENSED AGENTS
The Tenth Circuit upheld a summary judgment for the defendants in
Holer v. Moore & Co., 2 7 7 finding that Colorado's statutory regulation of the
real estate brokerage business precluded the conclusion that real estate sales
personnel were economically distinguishable from their employing bro-
ker.2 78 Accordingly, the plurality of economic actors necessary to support a
section 1 claim was lacking, and summary judgment was proper.2 79
Holer involved a claim that the standard seven percent commission
Moore and Company paid its real estate agents constituted both resale price
maintenance by Moore and its agents and horizontal price fixing by the sales
agents. 280 The trial court held that Moore and its agents constituted a single
indivisible economic entity, and that Moore and its agents were therefore
incapable of conspiring among themselves. 28 1 The Tenth Circuit began its
review by noting that because corporations can only act through their em-
ployees, as a general rule a corporation's employees cannot conspire with the
corporation or with each other when corporate matters are involved. 282 Fur-
ther, legal labels characterizing the nature of an employment relationship in
non-antitrust contexts are not determinative in antitrust analysis; the actors
must be "separate economic entities in substance. '"2 8 3 Because the question
of a party's separate economic status is a question of fact, 28 4 the Tenth Cir-
cuit's inquiry was limited to whether the record created an issue of economic
separateness for jury consideration.
2 5
The Tenth Circuit's first step in the analysis was an examination of
state laws requiring the defendants to conduct their business in a specified
manner. 286 Although characterizing an agent's status as independent ulti-
mately remained a question of federal law, 28 7 "state laws limiting the scope
272. See generaloy Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980)
(en banc).
273. Defendant asserted that plaintiff's business reversal was due to internal mismanage-
ment. 701 F.2d at 800.
274. Id. (quoting Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Sys., 694 F.2d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 1981)).
275. Eg., Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210 (1959).
276. 701 F.2d at 800.
277. 701 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 347 (1983).
278. Id. at 856-57.
279. Id. at 857.
280. Id. at 855.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 846 (lOth Cir. 1981)).
284. 702 F.2d at 855.
285. Id. at 856.
286. Id. at 856 & n.5.
287. Id. at 856.
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of a person's professional actions may effectively place that person under an
employer's supervision and control, in which event the employer will be the
only independent economic actor."288
Relevant Colorado statutory law provided that every real estate agent
must be licensed; 289 that a precondition to being licensed is securing an
agreement to work for a broker;
290 that an agent is issued only one license
29 '
which must be kept in the custody of his broker, 292 thereby precluding the
agent from simultaneously working for more than one broker. Additionally,
real estate services must be performed only in the broker's name;293 compen-
sation for the agent's services must be paid directly to the broker;29 4 and a
broker may not relinquish his authority to supervise his agents. 295 Moreover,
a broker's failure to reasonably supervise its agents may result in the revoca-
tion of a broker's license. 296 Weighing these statutory controls over an
agent's freedom against the proffered indicia of independence, 297 the court
found that Colorado's real estate laws created an employer-employee rela-
tionship between brokers and agents. 298 Accordingly, the defendants were
legally incapable of conspiring with each other.
2 99
VI. MEANING OF "GAME SITE" IN TELEVISED FOOTBALL EXEMPTION
The National Football League enjoys a statutory exemption from the
antitrust laws for its broadcast of football contests as long as the broadcasts
do not interfere with local college and high school games played during spec-
ified time periods. 3° ° To invoke this limitation on the antitrust exemption,
by August 1 of each year schools are required to give notice of the "game
sites" for local contests. 30 ' Colorado High School Acti'vit'es Association v. National
Football League,30 2 a case of first impression, required construction of the
phrase "game site" as used in the limitation to the antitrust exemption.
30 3
In 1977, 1978, and 1979, National Football League games were telecast
into the Denver market at the same time that the state high school football
championship contests were being played. 30 4 The Colorado High School
Activities Association conceded that it had not given notice of the exact geo-
288. Id.
289. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-102 (Supp. 1983).
290. Id. § 12-61-103(5).
291. Id. § 12-61-109(4).
292. Id. § 12-61-104(1) (1978).
293. 4 COLO. ADMIN. CODE 725- 1E-9 (1983).
294. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-117 (1978).
295. 4 COLO. ADMIN. CODE § 725-1E-9 (1983).
296. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-113(1)(o) (1978).
297. Real estate agents set their own hours, paid their own taxes, and only received commis-
sion income. 702 F.2d at 856.
298. Id. at 857. Accord Faith Realty & Dev. Co. v. Indus. Comm., 170 Colo. 215, 220, 460
P.2d 228, 230 (1969).
299. 702 F.2d at 857.
300. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1293 (1982).
301. See id. § 1293.
302. 711 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1983).
303. Id. at 945.
304. Id. at 944
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graphic location of the championship game sites. 30 5 The association noted
that its practice of playing the championship game at a site determined fol-
lowing an elimination tournament precluded such notice,30 6 and that
designation of championship game sites as "Denver" or "the Denver metro-
politan area" was the best possible notice which could be provided. 30 7 The
association then argued that, given the statutory purpose of protecting high
school game receipts, its geographic designations constituted compliance
with the statute.
30 8
Both the Tenth Circuit and the district court disagreed with the associa-
tion. 30 9 The Tenth Circuit resolved the dispute by concluding that the legis-
lative history evinced no intent to give the phrase "game site" other than its
plain, ordinary meaning. 310 That ordinary meaning was determined to be
the "particular football field or stadium where the game is to be played. 31 1
Because the association had not provided the NFL with the statutory game
sites, the NFL's challenged broadcasts did not violate the terms of the anti-
trust exemption.
312
VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS FAILURE AND
PURCHASE OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES
Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc. 313 affirmed a summary judgment ruling
against a plaintiff who had alleged the existence of anticompetitive conspira-
cies in portions of Oklahoma's baking business. 31 4 In affirming the summary
judgment, the Tenth Circuit set forth the ingredients necessary to recover on
a Sherman Act claim alleging that a competitor's purchase of production
facilities was anticompetitive. 31 5 Additionally, Campbell- Taggart addressed
the application of the Sherman Act's four-year statute of limitations31 6 to a
claim involving destruction of the plaintiff's business.
3 17
Curtis, the plaintiff in Campbell-Taggart, had been a professional baker
since 1947. 3 '8 His dispute with the defendants arose out of two bakery clos-
ings. The first involved the closing of Curtis' own bakery in 1969, allegedly
as the result of the defendants' conspiratorial activities. 31 9 The second clos-
ing involved a bakery owned by Curtis' employer, and gave rise to two anti-
trust claims. The first claim was that the defendants' conspiracy had forced
the closing of Curtis' employer's bakery in 1977; the second claim alleged
that defendants had conspired to prevent Curtis' purchase of the closed facil-




309. Set id. at 945.
310. Id. at 945-46.
311. Id. at 945.
312. Id. at 946.
313. 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.), cem. denied, 103 S. Ct. 576 (1982).
314. Id. at 337.
315. See id. at 338.
316. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).





ity, which defendants eventually purchased for themselves.
320
Plaintiff's claim relating to the forced closure of his bakery was brought
more than four years after the bakery closed. 32 ' Defendants therefore sought
summary judgment based upon the four-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to private Sherman Act claims. 322 Plaintiff argued that the forced clo-
sure of his plant resulted in a continuing violation, and that the claim was
therefore timely. 323 The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Because the applicable
statute of limitations runs from the date a defendant's acts cause injury to a
plaintiff,3 24 the relevant statute of limitations inquiry when seeking to bar a
claim entirely is the last date a defendant's acts cause injury to the plaintiff.
The Tenth Circuit held that when a claim is based on the destruction of a
plaintiff's business, the last day of business is the final date upon which a
defendant's acts cause injury to the plaintiff.325 Hence, plaintiff's first claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.
32 6
The court also summarily dismissed Curtis' claim that he was entitled to
recover for the closing of his employer's plant. Because Curtis was a salaried
employee at the time of the plant closing, he lacked standing to seek redress
for anticompetitive practices harming his employer.
327
Finally, the Tenth Circuit upheld dismissal of Curtis' claim relating to
the alleged conspiracy to prevent his purchase of his employer's closed
plant. 328 The court recognized that Curtis could potentially have standing
to assert this claim, 329 but held that Curtis had not, as a matter of law,
satisfied the requirements for such "excluded entrant" standing.330 The two
elements necessary for "excluded entrant" standing are a manifested intent
to enter a particular business, and a demonstrable preparedness to effect that
entry.3 3 ' No specific indicia of the necessary intent were set forth in Camp-
bell Taggart, but the court did set forth the following indicia of preparedness:
current financial ability to enter and operate the proposed business; existing
contractual obligations concerning purchase of the business; other affirma-
tive acts taken towards entry; and the proposed entrant's background and
experience. 332 Although Curtis' evidence showed an intention to enter and
showed extensive bakery experience, his inability to demonstrate a present
financial ability to purchase the plant precluded a finding that Curtis was
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id &Se 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).
323. 687 F.2d at 337.
324. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
325. 687 F.2d at 337 (citing Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117,
126 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub noain. Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv.
Corp., 423 U.S. 1054 (1976)).





331. ld. (quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977),cert denied,
436 U.S. 956 (1978)).
332. 687 F.2d at 338 (citing Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633-34 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 991 (1966)).
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prepared to enter the business.33 3 Accordingly, Curtis lacked standing to
bring a federal antitrust action based on the defendants' activities surround-
ing the final disposition of the closed plant.
334
Hartley Goldstone
333. S&e 687 F.2d at 338.
334. Id.
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